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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IRRIGATION COMPANY, a corporation,
Appellan,t,

\VARRE~

vs.

)lILTOX T. BRO\VN and
FLORENCE H. BRO\VN, his wife,

Case No.
12620

Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
'fhe defendants seek affirmance of the judgment
of the trial court principally on two grounds, ( ~) . r~s
judica ta and ( 2) lapse of time h~s barre~ the pla1~tiff s
right to relief. These points will be discussed m the
order stated.
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1. RES JUDICATA HAS NO APPLICATION TO

THIS CASE.

The law relating to res judicata is only partially
stated in the respondent's brief. It is pointed out that
" ... the principles of res judicata apply not only to
issues which were raised and litigated, but also to alJ
issues which could have been raised." (Res. br. p. 14)
The law is that where the causes of action differ,
res judicata is a bar only to the extent that the earlier
judgment actually raised and decided the same points
and issues which were raised in the later case. 'Ve
quote from the case of East :Mill Creek 'Vater Co. v.
Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P2d 863, cited by
defendants (Res. br. p. 14) continuing from the end
of the portion of the opinion quoted by defendants:
"On the other hand where the claim, demand
or cause of action is different in the two cases
then the former is res judicata of the latter only
to the extent that the former actually raised and
decided the same points and issues which are
raised in the latter. Harding Company v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417 186 N.E. 152 (and other cases)
. . . This distinction has been fallowed by this
court although not expressly pointed out. (Citing many cases) "
This is in accord with the general law.
50 CJS, p. 174

l\Iatters which have not been expressly, im·
pliedly, or necessarily determined are not con2

eluded by the judgment in a prior suit between
the parties, and where the second case is on a
different cause of action the prior judgment is
res judicata or operates as an estoppe1 only as
to matters actually litigated and determined.
The true test of the conclusiveness of a farmer
judgment with respect to particular matters is the
identity of issues. The adjudication of an issue in the
first case is not conclusive of an entirely different and
distinct issue arising in the second.
50 CJS pp. 198-200

.:\Iatters not in issue or necessarily involved in an
action, particularly matters which involve facts or rights
accruing after rendition of the judgment are not concluded in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action.
50 CJS p. 218

An adjudication as to the construction of a contract
is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
provided the particular question was actually or necessarily determined.
50 CJS p. 237

\Ve shall apply the principles discussed above to
the facts of this case. The defendants claim that the
issues framed by the pleadings in this case were, or
might have been, determined in the case of Lyman
Skeen v. \Varren Irrigation o., No. 4677, which resulted
in the stipulated decree dated November 10, 1914 and
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by an order dated February 5, 1938 after a hearing on
an order to show cause.

A review of the tile in Case :X o. 4677 and the 19U
decree indicates that although, (as in the East Mill
Creek case, supra,) the same instruments were involved
in No. 4677 as in the present case, the causes of action
were different and the issues decided were different.
See the Amended Complaint in Exhibit L., Case No.
4677, which is a suit by Lyman Skeen to restrain the
\Varren Irrigation Company from cutting down the
period of use of water due Lyman Skeen under the
exchange agreement evidenced by the 1903 and 1904
deeds from 110 hours of water to 48 hours of water.
The only issues determined by the stipulation and
decree based thereon were:
1. That 5 second feet of water would be delivered
under the 1903 deed every 14 days for a period of 48

hours during the months of April, May and June, beginning in 1915 in lieu of delivery as provided by the
decree (which was for a delivery of a constant flow
for 110 acres on the basis of one second foot for 150
acres) , and for reduction of the flow right to 4 second
feet during the months of July, August and September.
,2. That the sources of the Lyman Skeen \\Tater

were " . . . the natural sources of supply exclusive of
its said pumping plant."
3. The sum of $33.00 shall be paid each year " .. ·

in full for the water supplied and furnished." (Emphasis added).

The order to show cause which resulted in the 1938
order presented the issue as to whether on August 9,
1937 there was water available from natural sources
of supply for delivery to the petitioner of four second
feet of waetr as provided by the 1914 decree. The court
found that the water was so availabile, that the defendant and its officers were mistaken in their belief
that the water was not available and that they were
acting in good faith and were not wilfully intending to
violate tht 1914 decree. The only judgment entered was
for $54.30 which represented the cost of measuring the
water and costs of the court.
The issues in the present case include:
( 1 ) Whether the exchange of water rights was
terminated by the happening in 1969 of the condition

subsequent in the 1904 deed.
( 2) Whether the defendants were obligated to pay

their share of expenses of operation and maintenance
of the canal.

( 3) Whether the defendants can irrigate land outside of the area described in the 1903 deed.
( 4) Whether the defendants' water right has a

priority superior to the plaintiff's right.
( 5) 'Vhether all water awarded by the 1903 deed
as modified by the 1914 decree can be beneficially used

on the defendants' 50 acres of land.

be~e~t
without cost to them of diversion, storage and d1str1( 6) \Vhether the defendants can have the
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bution facilities constructed by the plaintiff at great
expense since February 11, 1903.
It is apparent from the above summary that this
suit states a different cause of action and raises issues
which were not litigated or decided by either the 1914
decree or the 1938 order. The 1914 decree simply
changed the method of delivery of water from a constant flow of less than one second foot to a much larger
flow for 48 hours every 14 days and restricted the source
of water to "natural sources of supply'' exclusive of
pumped water. The 1969 willful refusal to deliver
water under the 1903 deed had not happened in 1914
and 1938 and could not have been litigated. There was
no issue before the court in either case, ( 1) as to payment of operation and maintenance costs in addition
to $33.00 for the water, ( 2) as to whether the restriction as to place of use described in the 1903 deed could
be enforced, ( 3) as to the relative priorities of the water
rights of the plaintiff and defendants, and ( 4) as to
whether the defendants were entitled, without cost, or
expense to the benefit of improvements constructed by
the plaintiff since 1945 at costs, exceeding $80,000.00.
This latter issue obviously could not have been litigated
many years before the expenditures were made.

The 1938 order based on the findings of fact recited
therein determined that the petitioners were successors
to Lvman Skeen; that they were entitled to water delivertes in accordance with the 1914 decree and that
when the petition was filed in August, 1937, they were
entitled to water from the natural supply, but there
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were no issues pleaded or decided as to events which
involved the construction of the 1903 and 1904 deeds
'
or the other issues pleaded in the present case.
It is clear under the rules of law stated above that
the court erred in finding and decreeing that all issues
raised in the present case were adjudicated in the 1914
and 1938 proceedings.
2. LAPSE OF TIME HAS NOT BARRED THE

PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELIEF.

It was found by the trial court and argued at
length in the respondent's brief that because of the long
period of time since the 1903 and 1904 deeds, the 1914
decree and the 1938 order, the rights of the parties as
to the amount of annual assessments, the place of use
of water, and the sources of water delivered, the rights
of the parties have become fixed and cannot now be
disturbed.
This argument completely ignores the language
in the 1904 deed, " ... and no length of time shall vary
their part of this agreement." (See p. 33, App's. hr.),
which follows the provision that " ... in case the Utah
Light & Ra ilway Company or its grantor, the Pioneer
Electric Power Company or any of its or their assigns
or successors in interest, shall willfully ref use to carry
out the agreement-then the grant of the water right
shall cease and determine . . . "
The law is that where the language of a condition
subsequent is clear and specific it will be enforced.
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Houghton v. Socony Oil Co., 2:n CA 2d 188
41 Cal. Rptr. 714
'
Alamo School District v. Jones, 182 CA 2d 180
6 Cal. Rptr. 272
'
Rosecrans v. Pacific .Electric Ry. Co., 21 Cal.
2d 602, 134 P2d 245.
\\' ithout waiving our position that the enforcement
of the pro,·isions in the 1904 deed restores the parties
to their original positions, we wish to discuss further
reasons why the lapse of time has had no significance.
The law relating to changes of place of use as set
out in Section 8, Chapter 67, Laws of Utah, 1919
requiring changes only after tiling an application with
the state engineer, is perfectly clear and the fact that it
has been violated for many years does not legalize such
violation. The trial court completely ignored this statute.
As pointed out in the appellant's brief ( p. 6) since
1945 the plaintiff spent more than $80,000.00 improving
its distribution system of which more than $73,000.00
has been spent since 1962. The defendants' argument
that circumstances have not changed with reference
to annual assessments for the last 62 years is simply
contrarv to the facts. If the defendants' argument that
the 19i4 decree supersedes the 1903 deed which provided,
"Said water to he f umished from now existing
rights . . . ",
that the only restriction now is from "natural sources
of supply"' (except pumping), and that the annual
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assessment is $33.00 which by long lapse of time is
?inding regardless of circumstances, is sustained, it
1.s o~vious that there has been and will be a gross inJushce. The defendants will succeed in getting for
practically nothing the great benefit of payment of
assessments of from $2.00 to $7.00 per share since 1929.
The defendants if they had been carrying their share of
the load would have been paying $220.00 to $770.00
annually since that date.
The issues relating to the question as to whether
the defendants should pay operation and maintenance
expenses if they are to get the full benefit of the great
improvements in the distribution system in the 1960's
are new issues, and there has obviously been no long
lapse of time before raising them.
It should be pointed out that on page 28 of the
transcript the defendants, through their attorney, stipulated that they had no interest in water which has become
available after 1903 by purchase or improvements or
otherwise. This stipulation is acknowledged in the
respondents' brief, pages 25-26, but is not incorporated
into the findings and decree in this case. This was manifest error.
It is respectfully submitted that the decree in this
case should be reversed and the trial court should be
directed to enter a decree for the plaintiffs restoring
the parties to the water rights as they existed bef~re
the 1903-1904 exchange of water rights. If such relief
is not granted the present decree should be modified to

9

enforce the provisions of the 1903 deed as changed by
the 1914 decree and to grant to the plaintiff the equitable relief as prayed.

SKEEN AND SKEEN
E. J. Skeen
Attorney for Appellant
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